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1. INTRODUCTION
During the past two decades, many Latin American nations
were dubbed "emerging nations" and were given loans to enable
them to strengthen their economies. However, these nations have
had difficulty repaying their sovereign debt. The loans granted by
"developed" countries were sold to private creditors and restruc-
tured. In the past five years, several Latin American nations have
taken steps to achieve financial stability and reign in their sover-
eign debt through bond swaps and restructuring. Other Latin
American nations are teetering on the edge of default, and collabo-
ration with creditors may be their only chance to avoid economic
destruction. In some cases, however, creditors have refused to
participate in restructuring programs, leading to litigation. There
have been a series of cases in federal courts of the United States in-
volving Latin American nations and their creditors. Many of these
cases have taken place in the United States because they involve
creditors from the United States and because the loans were or-
ganized under United States law. Nevertheless, the sovereign debt
crisis has yet to be completely resolved in a manner that is accept-
able to both creditors and sovereign borrowers.
Many solutions have been proposed to resolve the sovereign
debt crisis in Latin America. To understand the crisis one must
first understand the background leading up to the crisis as well as
the steps that have already been taken to relieve the strain of debt
on both the debtholders and the borrowers. Section 2 of this
Comment sets out the history of loans to Latin America, leading up
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to the current debt crisis. Section 3 contains an analysis of the early
steps taken to provide relief to sovereign debtors, including vari-
ous restructuring plans and the securitization of the debt.
In Section 4 of this Comment, the most recent trends in debt re-
structuring are discussed. Additionally, this Section examines the
problem of a nation on the verge of default and poses a possible
solution. In Section 5, several representative cases brought by sov-
ereign debt creditors in federal courts in the United States are
summarized. This Comment only deals with cases brought within
the jurisdiction of the United States because these cases are both
typical of sovereign debt disputes and complementary to this
Comment's analysis of the United States government's policy re-
garding the sovereign debt crisis. Section 6 analyzes the effect of
litigation on the debt crisis and seeks to synthesize the United
States government's policy on the crisis. Section 7 describes two
proposed solutions to the continuing problem of holdout creditors
who refuse to participate in restructuring and choose to litigate in-
stead.
This Comment concludes, in Section 8, that in order to resolve
the sovereign debt crisis in Latin America, steps must be taken to
induce creditors to participate in voluntary restructuring plans,
thereby allowing more time for debtor nations to rebuild them-
selves. In addition, there must be a means of limiting the incen-
tives for creditors of sovereign nations to litigate.
2. HISTORY OF THE LATIN AMERICAN DEBT CRISIS
Following World War II, loans were extended to sovereign na-
tions under the Bretton Woods System.' This system, created un-
der the multinational Bretton Woods Agreement signed in 1944,
devised the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"). This agency
was designed to grant loans to countries in order to forestall eco-
nomic recessions.2 However, the amount of money lent to a par-
ticular nation was limited by the amount contributed by each
member. In addition, it was possible for the IMF to condition
lending based on a country's compliance with certain stipulations,
designed to promote the nation's financial stability and independ-
1 Theodore Allegaert, Recalcitrant Creditors Against Debtor Nations, or How to
Play Darts, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 429, 433 (1997).
2 Philip J. Power, Note, Sovereign Debt: The Rise of the Secondary Market and its
Implications for Future Restructurings, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 2701, 2709 n.31 (1996).
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ence. In spite of these restrictions, the Bretton Woods System was
a major source of funding for loans to sovereigns through the
1960s&4 The IMEF loans were simply intended as a band-aid, to tide
nations over during short-term economic difficulties. They were
used to avoid "the imposition of economic restraints which may
adversely affect the economies of both the distressed country and
of other nations."5 Indeed, the conditions placed on borrowing
governments by the JMF were structured as a barrier against the
use of economic restrictions as a mechanism for stabilizing the
economy.
However, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Bretton Woods
System started to crumble, in part because the contributions of
member nations to the INF did not increase at the same rate as in-
flation.6 For this reason, even though the IMF had more money, its
purchasing power decreased sharply in relation to what it had
previously been. Additionally, the IMT was no longer able to keep
a check on the currency exchange rates between nations, which led
to overvalued currencies and payment deficits.7
At the same time the Bretton Woods System began to disinte-
grate, the number of loans granted to sovereign nations by com-
mercial banks increased dramatically. In the 1970s, financial in-
stitutions in the United States received huge sums of money
deposited by wealthy oil-producing nations and were looking for
new investment markets.8 Meanwhile, the market prices of Latin
American exports increased during the first few years of the 1970s,
3 See Allegaert, supra note 1, at 433 (providing an overview of commerical
lending to sovereign states); see also ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY SYsTM § 8.4 (2d ed. 1984) (quoting the testimony of Dr. Arthur Burns
before the Joint Economic Committee on Feb. 23,1977).
4 See Allegaert, supra note 1, at 433 ("For many years, the Bretton Woods
System, with its emphasis on fixed exchange rates, worked tolerably well .... [1]t
provided a salutary check on LDCs' ever-increasing appetite for Western capi-
tal.").
5 Power, supra note 2, at 2709 n.31 (citing Jody D. Newman, Exchange Controls
and Foreign Loan Defaults: Force Majeure as an Alternative Defense, 71 IOWA L REV.
1499,1509 n.89, 1510 n.92 (1986)).
6 Allegaert, supra note 1, at 434.
7 THE FuTuRE OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYHSTI 1-2 (ramir Agmon et
al. eds., 1984).
8 Samuel E. Goldman, Comment, Mavericks in the Market: The Emerging Prob-
lem of Hold-Outs in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 5 UCLA J. INT'L L & FOREIGN AFF.
159,165 (2000).
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making Latin America seem like a solid target for investment.9
These less developed countries ("LDCs") looked to stabilize their
economies and expand their growth, and found that the Western
banks were more than willing to lend them money.' 0 This willing-
ness to grant loans to sovereign nations further weakened the
Bretton Woods System of the previous three decades. While the
IMF conditioned borrowing on certain rigid prerequisites, the
banks generally did not, making it easier for countries to get the
assistance they desperately wanted. Asking the IMF for money be-
came the less preferable loan option." While private banks pro-
vided only a third of all financing to LDCs in 1973, the percentage
rose to nearly half by 1976.12 Over the next four years, private
banks continued to provide a greater proportion of total loans to
sovereign borrowers, jumping to seventy percent in 1980.13 Ac-
cording to Rory MacMillan, "[b]etween 1973 and 1983, Latin
American external debt rose from about $48 billion to about $350
billion, amounting to 58% of the gross regional product."14
The Latin American debt crisis began in August 1982, when
Mexico declared that it could no longer pay the principal on its for-
eign debt.15 Other Latin American nations, including Brazil, Vene-
zuela, Argentina, and Bolivia, subsequently announced that they,
too, were unable to service their foreign creditors.' 6 There were
many factors that contributed to the defaults in loan payments, in-
cluding the oil crisis of the late 1970s that led to higher oil prices.
In order to pay for the amount of oil needed to keep their countries
9 See Alberto G. Santos, Note, Beyond Baker and Brady: Deeper Debt Reduction
for Latin American Sovereign Debtors, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 66, 72 (1991) (noting that
"rising world prices for raw materials-particularly food, metal, and oil products
exported by these countries-made many of the countries worthwhile credit
risks.").
10 Goldman, supra note 8, at 165.
11 See Allegaert, supra note 1, at 434 (explaining the reasons why sovereigns
preferred to ask for loans from Western banks).
12 Goldman, supra note 8, at 165-66.
13 Allegaert, supra note 1, at 435 (citing A Nightmare of Debt: A Survey of Inter-
national Banking, ECONOMIST, Mar. 20,1982, at 99).
'4 Rory MacMillan, The Next Sovereign Debt Crisis, 31 STAN. J. INT'L L. 305, 311
n.31 (1995) (citing PEDRO-PABLO KUCZYNSKI, LATIN AMERICAN DEBT 14 (1988)).
15 Ross P. Buckley, The Transformative Potential of a Secondary Market: Emerging
Markets Debt Trading From 1983 to 1989, 21 FRORDHAm INT'L L.J. 1152, 1152 (1998)
[hereinafter Buckley, 1983 to 1989].
16 Power, supra note 2, at 2708.
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functioning, governments were forced to borrow more money a7
Additionally, the United States raised its interest rates in 1981,
causing debtor nations to have higher interest payments than they
had anticipated.18 This combination of circumstances led many
Latin American debtor states to default or nearly default on their
loans.
3. EARLY STEPS TAKEN TO ALLEVIATE THE DEBT CRISIS
Following the announcement of the financial crisis in Latin
America, a series of steps were taken to curtail the further eco-
nomic collapse of the borrowing countries as well as the lending
banks and institutions themselves. These methods included bridge
loans, numerous restructurings, and the securitization of loans un-
der the Brady Plan.
3.1. Bridge Loans
One of the first preventive measures taken by the commercial
banks was the extension of bridge loans, which permitted countries
to continue paying the interest on their loans, even though they
were not able to pay the principal.19 Bridge loans were, in effect,
new loans granted by the banks to allow sovereigns to pay the in-
terest on their old loans. To ensure that no bank was paying a dis-
proportionate share of the new loans, each bank was only respon-
sible for contributing a specified percentage of its own outstanding
loans to the debtor nation.20
By permitting this form of transaction, the banks were protect-
ing themselves. Because the borrowing nations had not completely
defaulted on their payments, the banks could still declare the loans
as assets on their balance sheets.' Without this provision banks
were required by regulatory and accounting rules to declare a loan
"nonperforning 22 if interest payments were more than ninety
days late, an unfavorable prospect from the bank's financial per-
spective. It was especially vital that banks kept borrower nations
17 Id. at 2707.
Is Goldman, supra note 8, at 166; see also Power, supra note 2, at 2707.
19 Goldman, supra note 8, at166.
20 See Lee C. Buchheit, The Capitalization of Sovereign Debt: An Intraduclion,
1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 401,405 (1988).
21 Goldman, supra note 8, at 167.
22 Power, supra note 2, at 2710.
2001]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
from defaulting on their loans because many of the large banks
had loaned out more money than they actually had to lend. In fact,
when the debt crisis began in 1982, the nine largest commercial
banks had loaned 250% of their capital to sovereign debtors.23 It
was therefore imperative to the banks' own survival that the
debtor nations continued to pay, at the very least, the interest on
their loans. Thus, immediately following the announcement of the
debt crisis, many large banks extended new loans in order to pre-
vent complete default, in hopes of cutting their own losses.
3.2. Debt-Equity Swvaps and Restructuring
While bridge loans allowed sovereign debtors to continue
paying interest on their original loans, the banks also tried to re-
duce their exposure to the larger default, that on the principal of
the loans. However, smaller banks, holding less of the sovereign
debt, rid themselves of a larger percentage of their exposure to
sovereign debt without having to extend new loans to pay off the
old loans.24 Instead, these banks participated in "debt-equity
swaps," which involved the transfer of a loan held by one bank to
another bank or to a third party in exchange for an equity invest-
ment in the debtor country.25 However, since these substitutions
were only possible for a small portion of the debt, it was a practice
used more often by smaller banks.26
Debt rescheduling provided another means of restructuring the
loan principal following the sovereign debt crisis. Creditors rear-
ranged payment schedules to give debtors more time before the
payments became due.27 Because the smaller banks were in a bet-
ter position to reduce their exposure to Latin American debt, they
were often reluctant to participate in the debt reschedulings neces-
sary to keep the larger banks from folding in the event of sovereign
23 Id. at 2710 n.40; see also MacMillan, supra note 14, at 327 n.117 (detailing ex-
posure of large U.S. banks to risk via Latin American debt); Santos, supra note 9, at
82-83 (documenting the history of U.S. commercial bank debt exposure to devel-
oping countries).
24 See Power, supra note 2, at 2711 (describing the smaller banks' perspective
on extending new credit to debtor nations).
25 Alfred J. Puchala, Jr., Securitizing Third World Debt, 1989 COLUM. Bus. L.
REv. 137,138-39 (1989); see also Buckley, 1983 to 1989, supra note 15, at 1152.
26 Goldman, supra note 8, at 167.
27 See Robert Kenneth MacCallum, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: The Rights
and Duties of Commercial Banks Inter Sese, 1987 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 425,430 (1987)
(clarifying the difference between rescheduling and refinancing).
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loan default. This caused a great deal of tension between the large
and small banks, as the large banks had no choice but to restruc-
ture the loans, while the small banks were more capable of sur-
viving in the event of default. It was necessary for all, or substan-
tially all, of the creditors to work together in restructuring the
loans,28 but the small banks did not have any incentive to do so.
"By refusing to lend new money to a debtor country, a less ex-
posed bank could maintain its existing exposure to the country
with the assurance that the more exposed banks would not permit
the country to default on interest payments." 9 In order to elimi-
nate this problem, steps were taken to pressure unwilling creditors
into taking part in the loan restructuring.
The first stage in a rescheduling plan was usually to create a
steering committee30 called a Bank Advisory Committee ("BAC"),
comprised of twelve to fourteen of the largest bank creditors The
BAC served as a liaison among the creditors and was charged with
representing all of their interests. The advisory committee was
also responsible for direct negotiations with the debtor country.32
While the BAC was not officially able to impose restructuring
terms on smaller creditors, it was often in the creditors' best inter-
est to accept the terms negotiated by the BAC. As it was directly
involved both with the creditors and with the sovereign debtors,
the advisory committee was in the best position to glean informa-
tion about the debtors' intentions regarding repayment. Therefore,
in practice, the smaller creditors generally accepted the restruc-
turing terms designated by the advisory committees, which often
included the extension of bridge loans in order to prevent total de-
fault by debtors.33
In addition, a typical restructuring included the extension of
additional loans by the IMF. However, the IMF often refused to
23 See Lee C. Bucbheit & Ralph Reisner, T7 Effect of the Sovereign Debt Restnc-
turing Process on Inter-Creditor Relationships, 1988 U. ILL L. REv. 493,494 (1938) (ar-
guing that "the sovereign debt restructuring process has forced the international
banking community into an uneasy confederation.").
29 Power, supra note 2, at 2711.
30 Ross P. Buckley, Rescheduling as the Groundwork for Secondary Markelts in
Sovereign Debt, 26 DENY. J. INT'L L. PoL'Y 299, 300 (1998) [hereinafter Buckley, Rc-
scheduling].
31 Goldman, supra note 8, at 167.
32 Power, supra note 2, at 2712.
33 Id. at 2712 rL48 (discussing the practical implications of the BAC with re-
spect to the smaller creditors).
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grant loans unless the sovereign debtors agreed to follow a
"structural adjustment program."34 These programs called for eco-
nomic austerity,5 in order to improve the financial climate within
debtor nations so that they eventually could repay their loans.36
3.2.1. The Effects of the Restructuring
The restructuring and rescheduling of debt in this form contin-
ued throughout the 1980s, and some countries went through this
process more than once.37 "Eleven countries, including Argentina
and Mexico, restructured their debt 10 or more times."38 Many be-
lieved that rescheduling was the solution to the sovereign debt cri-
sis and that time would, essentially, heal all wounds.39 While in
some respects this was true for the commercial banks, rescheduling
had the opposite effect on the debtor nations and their citizens.
The extension of "new loans" to the sovereign debtors allowed
them to keep paying interest on theif bank loans, which enabled
the banks to regain some of their financial stability.40 However, as
time passed, the conditions faced by the people living in the bor-
rower nations only deteriorated. In order to continue meeting their
schedules for paying interest, sovereign debtors were forced to
take out more loans, putting them even further into debt. In spite
of the austerity programs put into place by the IMF as a precondi-
tion for the new loans, many countries were unable to meet their
payment obligations when the maturity dates for the rescheduled
loans arrived.41 In addition, the per capita gross domestic product
in Latin America declined throughout the 1980s. 42 Unemployment
34 Buckley, Rescheduling, supra note 30, at 301.
35 Id. at 301 n.l (explaining the reasons why the IMF, and not the commer-
cial banks, stepped into the role of economic overseer).
36 Power, supra note 2, at 2712.
37 Allegaert, supra note 1, at 436 ("In the wake of the Latin American debt cri-
sis came a series of restructurings of the sovereign debts of developing countries,
followed in many cases by restructurings of the restructurings ...
38 Power, supra note 2, at 2713 n.62.
39 See Robert A. Pastor, The Debt Crisis: A Financial or a Development Problem?,
in LATIN AMERIcAN DEBT CRIsIs: ADJUSTING TO THE PAST OR PLANNING FOR THE
FUTURE? 5, 11 (Robert Pastor ed., 1987) (discussing the debate over whether re-
scheduling would end the debt crisis).
40 Buckley, Rescheduling, supra note 30, at 303.
41 Power, supra note 24, at 2713 n.61.
42 See Jesus Silva-Herzog, The Costs for Latin America's Development, in LATIN
AMERICAN DEBT CRsIs: ADJUSTING TO THE PAST OF PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE? 33, 35
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levels skyrocketed, and "[by] 1993, 60 million more Latin Ameri-
cans had been driven below the poverty line, bringing the total to
nearly half of the population."43 Hundreds of people died in
Venezuela while protesting the severity of the austerity programs
imposed by the government on behalf of the nation's creditors 44
While the Western banks were able to recoup their losses to some
extent, it came at a terrible cost to the borrowing nations.
3.3. The Brady Plan: The Securitization of Sovereign Debt
It soon became dear that the repeated restructuring of sover-
eign debt in Latin America was not working as well as had been
hoped. The borrowing countries became even further embroiled in
debt, with no means of extricating themselves, and their people
were suffering from its effects. The banks continued treating the
loans as performing assets because they received interest pay-
ments, but there was no hope that the principal would be paid on
the loans at any time in the foreseeable future. In addition, in or-
der for loan restructuring to actually take place, there had to be
collaboration between the advisory committees, the smaller credi-
tors, the IMF, and the debtor state-and each faction wanted con-
cessions from the others 45 There was dearly a need for a new ap-
proach to resolve the sovereign debt crisis.
In 1989, Nicholas Brady, who was the United States Secretary
of the Treasury at the time, announced a scheme designed to "en-
courage banks voluntarily to reduce the debt burdens of LDC
debtors."46 The proposal recognized that drastic measures, in-
cluding partial debt forgiveness, were necessary in order to set the
Latin American nations back on their own feet.47 The Brady Plan
("Brady"), as it came to be known, called for the securitization of
(Robert Pastor ed., 1987) (tracing the difficulties Latin American countries had
finding resources to aid with the burdenson debts in the 1980's).
43 Duncan Green, Hidden Fist Hits the Buffers, NEv INTERNATrONAUSr, Oct.
1995, at 35.
44 Walter Mossberg & Peter Truell, Another Round: Bush Aides are Li7ely to Of-
fer a Plan Soon on Third World Debt, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9,19S9, at Al.
45 See Power, supra note 2, at 2712-13 (demonstrating the ways in which each
group was both dependent on the others and trying to manipulate them, with the
result that "action was taken either collectively or not at all").
46 Id. at 2720.
47 See Ross P. Buckley, The Facilitation of the Brady Plan: Emerging Markets Debt
Trading from 1989 to 1993, 21 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1802, 1804 (1998) [hereinafter
Buckley, 1989 to 1993] (introducing the beginnings of the Brady Plan).
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the loans owed by sovereign debtors. The loans were converted
into bonds backed by U.S. Treasury Bonds and offered to the gen-
eral public. The money generated by the sale of the bonds was
then used to pay off the country's debt.48
Under this arrangement, the banks no longer worried that they
would collapse if a debtor state was forced to default on its loans,
and the sovereign nations were absolved of the debt owed to the
banks. Instead, the investors who had purchased the bonds peri-
odically received payments that were dispersed through a fund set
up for this purpose.49 Sovereign debtors also benefited in other
ways by Brady Plan securitizations. Brady Bonds issued at a dis-
count from the original loans, thereby reducing the debtor's obli-
gations. Additionally, they had a longer maturity date before
payments were due, 0 which allowed sovereigns more time to gen-
erate revenue and rebuild their economies.
The Brady Plan also enabled individual investors to participate
in and profit from the sovereign debt market.51 Since participation
in a Brady restructuring was voluntary,52 creditors had the option
of holding on to their portion of the debt. In addition, for those
who chose to invest in Brady bonds, many contained "exit cove-
nants," in which sovereign debtors waived their rights to request a
restructuring of the bonds. If the agreement was violated, it was
considered a default.53 This provided some security for the inves-
tors. It was also possible for investors to trade or sell their bonds.
Under the Brady Plan, there were many more investors, each
holding a smaller piece of the debt, which allowed for greater
flexibility than the pre-Brady market did.
Since the Brady Plan was introduced less than eleven years
ago, many Latin American sovereigns have converted their bank
loans to Brady bonds. These nations include Mexico, Costa Rica,
Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, and Peru. Until very recently, most
of the outstanding sovereign debt was held in the form of Brady
48 Power, supra note 2, at 2720.
49 Puchala, supra note 25, at 137-38.
50 Power, supra note 2, at 2721.
51 Goldman, supra note 8, at 168.
52 Buckley, 1989 to 1993, supra note 47, at 1804.
53 See Lee C. Buchheit, The Evolution of Debt Restructuring Techniques, INT'L
FIN. L. REv., Aug. 1992, at 12.
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bonds.54
4. THE CURRENT SrUATION AND ITS POSSIBLE EFFEcrs
In the past few years, however, many Latin American sover-
eign debtors exchanged their Brady debt for global bonds or other
types of debt.55 Mexico led the way in 1996 when it exchanged
$1.75 billion in Brady bonds for a thirty-year global bond.5s As of
June 2001, the amount of Latin American sovereign debt held in
the form of Brady bonds decreased from $129 billion to $63.5 bil-
lionL57
4.1. Theory Behind Exchanging Brady Bonds
Latin American governments look more favorably upon the
idea of exchanging their Brady debt for several reasons. Many
Brady bonds are backed by United States Treasury zero coupon
bonds, which act as collateral or as a guarantee and give investors
greater security.5 s A country's ability to exchange collateralized
bonds for uncollateralized bonds is therefore indicative of its
strength. Investors are more wary of and shy away from collater-
alized bonds because they represent a much greater risk.5 9 Finan-
ciers feel that their investments are safer if the purchased bonds are
not supported by credit enhancements, such as Treasury bonds,
and are therefore more reluctant to invest in bonds that are sup-
54 Power, supra note 2, at 2722-23; see also BuRAFF PUBuCATIONS,
INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION REPORT, June 8, 1995 (stating that "Brady
Bond trading in 1994 was nearly seven times that of loan trading.").
5, Many Latin American nations have begun swapping Brady debt with euro
and Samurai markets, as well as with dollar-based global bonds. See, e.g., Joshua
Chaffin & Arkady Ostrovsky, International Capital Markets: Mexico Highlights De-
mise of the Brady, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 27, 2001, at 36 (noting the welcome
shrinking of the Brady bond market).
56 Maria O'Brien, Queens of the Curve, LATINFINANcE, June 2001, at 22 [herein-
after O'Brien, Queens].
57 See id. (listing the Merrill Lynch figures for Brady debt in Argentina, Mex-
ico, and Brazil); cf Chaffin & Ostrovsky, supra note 55, at 36 (stating that accord-
ing to the International Institute of Finance, the amount of outstanding Brady
bonds decreased from "$121.4 b[illioln in 1998 to $83.5 b[ilhio]n at the end of
2000.").
ms Chaffin & Ostrovsky, supra note 55, at 36; O'Brien, Queens, supra note 56, at
17.
,9 See Chaffin & Ostrovsky, supra note 55, at 36 ("[B]y swapping out of Brady
bonds, countries in the emerging markets universe were also getting rid of a
stigma attached to any restructure debt.").
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ported by such credit enhancements. Releasing the collateral also
frees up money that would normally be used to secure the guar-
antees, allowing Latin American governments to put it to more
productive uses.60
In addition, asking investors to replace their Brady holdings
with global bonds or other forms of long-term debt permits in-
debted sovereigns to extend the amount of time before the bonds
reach maturity. This buys the sovereigns more time before paying
off the bondholders.61 In this way, nations, ideally, are able to
strengthen their economies before their debts mature.
Daniel Gleizer, the international director at Brazil's central
bank, sums up debt exchanges by saying, "The cute thing about
[debt exchanges] is that they have the ability to meet a lot of objec-
tives simultaneously, set the benchmark for the private sector,
smooth out the profile of the debt and achieve net present value
savings with one transaction." 62 The fact that Latin American gov-
ernments can take such large steps towards financial stability
through an exchange of Brady bonds shows they made significant
progress. Nicholas Brady, who created the Brady bond and is now
the chairman of Darby Overseas Investments, is quoted as saying
that Brady bond exchanges "represent the end of a transition dec-
ade-a decade when many emerging market countries moved from
debt restructuring to a fuller participation in the global econ-
omy."63 In fact, he believes the decrease in the number of out-
standing Brady bonds is a sign of their success;64 it means that the
Latin American economies are beginning to stand on their own.
60 Id.; O'Brien, Queens, supra note 56, at 17.
61 See Argentina-Debt Argentine Government Announces Bond-Swap, EFE NEWS
SERVICE, May 5,2001 (discussing how a debt swap would replace bonds with four-
year maturities with bonds maturing in seven to thirty years); John Barham, Shed-
ding its Burden, LATINFINANE, June 2001, at 26; Brasil Emite $5 bi e Alonga Divida
Externa (Brazil Sells $5bn of Bonds and Extends Foreign Debt Payment over a Longer
Period), 0 GLOBO, Aug. 11, 2000 ("mhe government managed to extend its debt
payment by an average of 32 years by replacing Brady bonds with an average
length to maturity of almost 8 years."); O'Brien, Queens, supra note 56, at 17; Maria
O'Brien, Ready to Rehabilitate Argentina, LATINFINANE, Mar. 1, 2001, at 89 [herein-
after O'Brien, Rehabilitate]; Jennifer L. Rich, Latin American Markets Show a Glimmer
of Hope, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2001, § W, at 1; Argentina to Follow Brazil's Steps and Is-
sue Debt, GAZETA MERCANTIL ONLINE, Jan. 9, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Major World Publications File.
62 O'Brien, Queens, supra note 56, at 18.
63 Chaffin & Ostrovsky, supra note 55, at 36.
64 Id.
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However, as the following example illustrates, Mr. Brady's opti-
mism might be a bit premature.
4.2. Argentina: An Ongoing Example
Argentina, the second-largest country in South America, 63 is re-
sponsible for paying back a large proportion of Latin America's
sovereign debt, estimated at between $123 billion and $130 bil-
lion.66 However, for the past three years, Argentina has been suf-
fering a recession.67 In fact, Argentina's sovereign debt as a pro-
portion of gross domestic product has doubled since 1992f6
Additionally, the economy contracted and unemployment in-
creased in the past two years.69 Furthermore, the government of
Fernando de la Rua has not been successful in its attempts to slow
the recession. Two economic ministers, Jos6 Luis Machinea and
Ricardo Lopez Murphy, resigned in March 2001 after they failed to
"mobilize sufficient political support for implementation of tough
fiscal austerity measures, designed to bring the federal budget back
65 CIA Factbook-Argentina, at http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications
/factbook/geos/ar.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2001).
66 Latin America Sovereign Debt Market and Credit Ratings, LATINFINANCE, Dec.
2000, at 12 [hereinafter Sovereign Debt Market]; Daniel Merolla, Financial Pages,
Argentina's Risk Premium Soars Amid Popular Strikes, Speculative Attacks, AGENCE
FRANCE PREssE, Aug. 2, 2001, at 2; O'Brien, Queens, supra note 56, at 17; David
Plumb, Investors Fear Default Closefor Argentina: US $130-billion in Debt, NAT'L POST
(formerly FiN. Posr), Aug. 2, 2001, at C10; David Roche, Opinion, Latin American
Economies on the Brink, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 23, 2001, at 8; Jonathan Wheatley,
Trying to Dance Away from Default, Bus. WK., July 30,2001, at 78.
67 See, e.g., Argentine Lawmakers Debate Giving Government Special Powers,
AGENcE FRANCE PRESSE, Mar. 26, 2001, at 1 [hereinafter Argentine Lawmakers] (an-
nouncing contemplatioft of special powers for Argentina's government); Barham,
supra note 61, at 26 (explaining that Argentina was in the longest was in the long-
est recession in its history at the time of the article); Daniel Kruger, Riding Out the
Russias, FoRBEs, June 11, 2001, at 208 (emphasizing the need for patience of inves-
tors during Argentina's recession); Mitchell Martin, Argentina's Economic Plight
Deepens; Cancellation of Debt Sale Undermines Co!fidence in Emerging Markets, I r'L
HERALD TRIB., Apr. 24, 2001, at I (describing an increase in investor's concerns
about likelihood of default by Argentina); O'Brien, Rehabilitate, supra note 61, at
89; Robert Taylor, Cavallo's Second Coming: Robert Taylor Reports on Domingo
Cavallo's Return to the Political Fray in Recession-Wracked Argentina, BANkeR, May 9,
2001 (commenting on the expectations accompanying Argentina's new cabinet
member).
63 Barham, supra note 61, at 26; see also Sovereign Debt Market, supra note 66, at
12 (stating that Argentina's debt is likely to grow because the government wil
probably spend more than it raises in taxes and that it is likely to grow relative to
the overall economy).
69 Argentine Lawmakers, supra note 67, at1.
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in line with 2001 targets in Argentina's IMF programme."70
Upon their resignation, Domingo Cavallo, who held the posi-
tion of economic minister in Carlos Menem's cabinet a decade ago,
returned to the position, in hopes that he was able to bring an end
to Argentina's recession.7' During his first term, Cavallo instituted
a system which pegged the Argentine peso in a one-to-one ratio
with the United States' dollar.72 That system is currently place and,
until recently, it was highly successful at curbing inflation.
In December 2000, the IMF loaned approximately $40 billion to
Argentina in order to prevent the government from defaulting on
its debts.73 Argentina also undertook several debt swaps since the
beginning of 2001 in an effort to extend payment dates and to sta-
bilize the economy. The largest and most promising of these,
which took place in early June, succeeded in exchanging nearly $30
billion in short-term debt for bonds with longer-term maturities.74
Most recently, on August 1, 2001, the Argentine government
agreed to swap $1.3 billion of Treasury bills in order to push back
its repayment obligations.75
Unfortunately, nothing, including the bond swaps and the one-
to-one dollar currency peg, was successful enough to stabilize Ar-
gentina's economy and bring it out of the three-year recession. In
an effort to end the recession and return Argentina to economic
health, Cavallo, the original proponent of the currency peg, an-
nounced plans to dilute the currency basket by including the euro.
This would effectively end the peg to the dollar.76
Other remedies are also being tried in order to put Argentina
back on track so that it will not default on its sovereign loans.
Cavallo also introduced a seven percent peso devaluation for ex-
70 Taylor, supra note 67, at 903.
71 Id.
72 Martin, supra note 67, at 1; Roche, supra note 66, at 8; Sovereign Debt Market,
supra note 66, at 12. Under this pegging system, Argentina's "central bank is re-
quired to hold one US dollar for each peso it issues, although it does not have
enough hard currency to cover its total liabilities .... " Sovereign Debt Market, su-
pra note 66, at 13.
73 Argentine Lawmakers, supra note 67, at 1; O'Brien, Rehabilitate, supra note 61,
at 89; Taylor, supra note 67, at 903.
74 Rich, supra note 61, at 1; Wheatley, supra note 66, at 78.
75 Argentina Wants US $8bn in Loans to Protect Currency, GAZErA MERCANTIL
ONLINE, Aug. 1, 2001, at 1, available at LEXIS, News Library, Major World Publica-
tions File; Plumb, supra note 66, at C10.
76 Martin, supra note 67, at 1; Roche, supra note 66, at 8.
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porters.77 In addition, the government recently approved several
austerity programs designed to keep Argentina on its payment
schedule. On July 11, 2001, President Fernando de la Rua an-
nounced a "zero deficit policy," meaning that the government will
spend only what it collects in taxes.78 The plan, approved by the
Argentine Senate late in July, caused hundreds to demonstrate in
protest of the severe pay cuts that came along with it79
4.2.1. The End Result: Should Argentina Default?
If the situation in Argentina does not improve in the next few
months, Argentina will have no choice but to default While there
is strong incentive for the government to continue maldng its pay-
ments on time, default might not necessarily be such a bad option.
In August 2000, Ecuador became the first nation to default on
its $6.65 billion sovereign debt, resulting in a forced restructuring
of the old bonds.8 0 The exchange of the old debt for new erased
forty percent of the principal and put Ecuador on a strict IMF pro-
gram to regain economic stability.' In the year since the regimen
was instituted, Ecuador's economy slowly improved.8
Although it is too early to predict how soon Ecuador will re-
turn to economic health, the preliminary success of the August
2000 restructuring may be a sign that perhaps default, or a partial
default, might not be the worst option for Argentina. Some of the
existing debt would be cancelled, and while it would probably
mean a return to collateralized Brady bonds, that might be just
what Argentina needs to get itself back on track. In addition, re-
structuring buys more time, as the new bonds could have longer
maturity dates. Interest rates would be raised, in order to appease
investors, but in the long run, Argentina's financial self-sufficiency
77 Roche, supra note 66, at 8.
7 See Daniel Helft, Argentina's Debt Problems Expected to Spill Over, IND-us-y
STANDARD, at http://www.thestandard.com/article/0,1902,27897,00html (last
visited Sept 17, 2001); Merolla, supra note 66, at 1; Vote Draws Protests, Market Ap-
proval in Argentina, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, July 30, 2001, at 1-2 [hereinafter Vote
Draws Protestsl.
79 Merolla, supra note 66, at 2; Vote Draws Protests, supra note 78, at 1.
90 Deepak Gopinath, Putting Ecuador's House in Order, II"mrnvoAL
INVESTOR (INT.), Sept. 2000, at 11; O'Brien, Queens, supra note 56, at 24.
81 Gopinath, supra note 80, at 11.
82 See O'Brien, Queens, supra note 56, at 24 (discussing Ecuador's forced re-
structuring).
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is worth what will turn out to be a paltry sum.
However, Ecuador's sovereign debt was a mere pittance com-
pared to what Argentina has borrowed. For that reason, default by
Argentina will have a much more significant effect on other Latin
American nations, especially Brazil, with whom Argentina con-
ducts trade.83
Therefore, if the recent bond swaps fail to bring relief to Ar-
gentina's debt crisis in the next few months, Argentina should ne-
gotiate with its creditors in order to avoid a complete default. Ar-
gentina should try to strike a deal in which debtholders will agree
to decrease the principal on the loans in exchange for a return to
Brady bonds secured by United States Treasury bonds. Complete
default on Argentina's sovereign debt will wreak havoc on the
economies not only of other Latin American nations, but on Asia as
well.84 In order to maintain economic stability throughout the
world, creditors and debtors must work together to find a solution.
Ninety-seven percent of Ecuador's sovereign creditors agreed to
restructure their holdings.8 5 Perhaps Argentina's debtholders will
be as willing to aid the country in its struggle for economic well-
being.
5. RECENT JUDICIAL DECISIONS INVOLVING
SOVEREIGN DEBT CREDITORS
Not all of the creditors of sovereign nations will necessarily
choose to convert their holdings into Brady bonds. In the past few
years, an increasing number of cases brought in federal courts of
the United States involved creditors of Latin American nations
seeking payment on their portions of the debt. These suits are of-
ten brought by either creditors who did not participate in Brady re-
structurings or by assignees of original creditors of the sovereign
loans. Many of the suits are brought because each creditor is a
holder of a relatively small segment of the debt, and "small debt
makes the chance of recovery greater, since foreign nations are
more likely to have some assets to attach in the U.S., though not
enough to satisfy a large damage award." 86
8 Helft, supra note 78 at "1; Roche, supra note 66, at 8; Sovereign Debt Market,
supra note 66, at 12; Wheatley, supra note 66, at 78.
84 See Roche, supra note 66, at 8 ("Even Asia would not be immune to a Latin
American crisis.").
85 Gopinath, supra note 80, at 11; O'Brien, Queens, supra note 56, at 25.
86 Goldman, supra note 8, at 171.
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It is possible that creditors refrain from engaging in Brady or
other similar restructuring plans in the hopes that they will recover
damages through the use of the court system. In other words, suits
are brought because creditors believe that they have a greater
chance of being paid than if they waited for the borrowers to make
their scheduled payments. Analysis of these cases will show that
this incentive has led to greater problems and less actual recovery
than the creditors may have hoped. Therefore, it is necessary to
devise a more equitable solution that will benefit not only the
creditors, but the impoverished debtors as well.
5.1. CIBC Bank & Trust Co. Ltd. v. Banco Central do Brasil
The case of CIBC Bank & Trust Co. Ltd. v. Banco Central do Bra-
si,87 decided in 1995, was a landmark case involving the alleged
breach of contract of a sovereign debt restructuring agreement.
The agreement at issue, the Multi-Year Deposit Facility Agreement
("MYDFA"), was signed in 1988 by the country of Brazil, its Cen-
tral Bank, and many of the creditors holding Brazil's sovereign
debt, in order to "restructure that debt, and to facilitate an orderly
repayment of it, in the wake of Brazil's inability to make timely
loan payments during the mid-1980s."63 In 1989, the MYDFA was
reworked and renegotiated under a Brady-type plan ("the 1992 Fi-
nancing"), as Brazil was once again unable to make timely pay-
ments on its loans.89 Under the 1992 Financing, creditors had the
option of exchanging their MYDFA debt for new debt instruments.
Although a majority of the creditors agreed to go along with
this conversion plan, two refused and held on to their debt pursu-
ant to the terms of the MYDFA. The Dart family, beneficial owners
of the plaintiff's portion of the debt, retained $1.4 billion of
MYDFA debt instead of converting it.90 One of the defendants in
the action, Banco do Brasil, also maintained $1.6 billion in MYDFA
debt following the 1992 Financing. According to the complaint,
"Brazilian officials ordered [Banco do Brasil] to retain that amount
of MYDFA debt in order to ensure that the Darts would not hold a
87 CIBC Bank & Trust Co. (Cayman) Ltd. v. Banco Central do Brasil, 886 F.
Supp. 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
83 Id. at 1107.
89 Id.
90 See id. (explaining the background of Brazil's debt).
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majority of the remaining MYDFA debt...."9
In May 1994, Bankers Trust, Bear Steams, and Salomon Broth-
ers, who were the previous holders-of-record of the Dart family's
portion of the MYDFA debt, assigned the debt to CIBC Bank and
Trust Company (Cayman), Ltd. ("CIBC") to act on behalf of the
Darts. CIBC then turned in an "Agreement to be Bound," but the
Banco Central do Brasil ("Banco Central") refused to acknowledge
the assignment, claiming that the debt had to be assigned to the
Darts family itself.92
In its complaint, CIBC brought eight claims against the Banco
Central, the Banco do Brasil, and Citibank.3 The court determined
that the debt was properly assigned to CIBC and found that the
relationship between the Dart family and CIBC was analogous to
the relationship between the Dart family and its previous holders-
of-record, Bankers Trust, Bear Steams, and Salomon Brothers. It
was noted, however, that unlike the relationship with CIBC, "those
relationships were never challenged by the defendants." 94
The court also rejected the defendants' contention that the case
should be dismissed because it violated the anti-champerty provi-
sions of section 489 of the New York Judiciary Law.95 Champerty
is a practice "in which one person, the champertor, agrees to sup-
port another in bringing a legal action, in exchange for part of the
proceeds of the litigation."96 In this case, the defendants argued
that the plaintiffs were assigned the Darts' MYDFA debt specifi-
cally for the purpose of bringing a lawsuit and recovering money
from Brazil.97 This addresses the heart of the reasoning behind the
prohibition of champerty: that permitting champertous actions in-
creases the filing of frivolous litigation and this, in turn, leads to
91 Id. The MYDFA allows for the potential acceleration of all MYDFA debt if
Brazil defaults, so long as more than 50% of the creditors vote for acceleration. It
was therefore important to Brazil that the Darts remained in control of less than
50% of the remaining MYDFA debt.
92 See id.
93 Id. at 1108.
94 Id. at 1110.
9- Id. at 1110 n.5. According to "[s]ection 12.11, the MYDFA 'shall be gov-
erned by, and construed in accordance with, the laws of the State of New York,
United States.'" Id.
96 Susan Lorde Martin, Financing Plaintiffs' Lawsuits: An Increasingly Popular
(and Legal) Business, 33 U. MIcH. J.L. REFORM 57,58 (1999).
97 See CIBC, 886 F. Supp. at 1110.
[Vol. 22:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol22/iss3/5
LATIN AMERICAN DEBT CRISIS
increased damages.3 The court found, however, that CIBC did not
violate the New York champerty statute in filing this lawsuit The
defendants did not meet their burden of proving that the assign-
ment of the MYDFA suit was made for the specific purpose of liti-
gation.99 This finding is important in analyzing the United States'
policy regarding Latin American sovereign debt, as it is a very pro-
creditor stance. 00
Although it denied the defendants relief on their defenses to
the complaint, the court dismissed six of the eight claims brought
by the plaintiff.1°l The court did not dismiss the CIBCs claim that
Banco Central breached the MYDFA in refusing to pay part of the
interest due to CIBC's predecessors as holders of debt. Banco
Central did not deny these allegations.102 In addition, the court al-
lowed plaintiff's third claim, which asked for indemnification of
the expenses incurred by CIBC as a result of the defendants' al-
leged breach of the MYDFA.103
The court, however, dismissed the remainder of plaintiff's
claims, pursuant to the motions filed by the defendants. The
fourth claim in the complaint was the only one lodged against all
three of the defendants. In this claim, CIBC contended that it had
the power to accelerate the payment of the principal under the
MYDFAj04 Section 10.01(a) of the MYDFA defines the nonpay-
ment of any amount of principal or interest as termination of the
agreement. Under the provisions of this section, if the obligation is
terminated, a simple majority of the holders of outstanding debt
93 See generally Note, The Effect of Chanmperty on Contractual Liabilihy, 79 LA1w Q.
REV. 493, 494 (1963) (explaining that the common law had long forbidden chain-
pertour agreements on the grounds that such agreements tended to inflame dam-
ages).
99 See CIBC, 886 F. Supp. at 1111; see also Fairchild Hiller Corp. v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 270 N.E.2d 691, 693 (N.Y. 1971) ("rThe question of intent and
purpose of the purchaser or assignee of a claim is usually a factual one to be de-
cided by the trier of facts .... ").
100 See discussion infra Section 6 for a further analysis of the champertous
motives of creditors.
101 See CIBC, 886 F. Supp. at 1120 (holding that Banco Centrals motion to
dismiss was granted in part and denied in part).
10 Id. at 1111.
103 Id. at 1113 (finding that although CIBC failed to submit the required notice
and an itemization of its expenses, it would have been futile for CIBC to do so and
therefore refused to dismiss that count of the complaint).
104 Id. at 1113.
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can declare an acceleration of the principal.105 The defendants ar-
gued that because Banco do Brasil owned more MYDFA debt than
CIBC, CIBC did not have the authority to unilaterally declare an
acceleration, and that because Banco do Brasil refused to consent to
an acceleration, CIBC was precluded from doing so. 106 The plain-
tiff argued that the Banco do Brasil's share of the MYDFA should
not be counted because it was retained "in a bad faith maneuver
designed to block CIBC's acceleration attempt."'107 Although the
plaintiff pointed to four sources of law to bolster its position,108 the
court found these justifications to be completely unfounded. In
dismissing this claim, the court announced that "it is clear that the
provisions of the MYDFA expressly allow [Banco do Brasil] to re-
tain MYDFA debt and to vote its share of that debt in order to hin-
der an attempt at acceleration by another creditor."10 9
The case was subsequently settled. Brazil agreed to pay the
Dart family $25 million in cash and $52.3 million in bonds.110
5.2. LNC Investments, Inc. v. Republic of Nicaragua
The case of LNC Investments, Inc. v. Republic of Nicaragua"' was
brought in federal court in the Southern District of New York, and
decided in February, 1999. At issue in the case was the defendant's
failure to pay the money owed to the plaintiff in the form of debt
obligations. The plaintiff, LNC Investments ("LNC"), a wholly
owned subsidiary of Leucadia National Corporation ("Leucadia"),
owned debt and equity securities on Leucadia's behalf.112
On December 11, 1980, Nicaragua entered into a restructuring
agreement ("1980 Loan Agreement"), which specified terms by
which it was to repay its sovereign debt ("Category I Debt"). 113
105 Id. (citing MYDFA § 10.01, X-7, X-8).
106 Id.
107 Id. at 1114.
108 The plaintiff argued that the New York common law of compositions, the
federal Bankruptcy Code, the federal Trust Indenture Act of 1939, and the New
York Business Corporation Law supported its proposition that Banco do Brasil's
holdings should have been excluded because of bad faith. See id.
109 Id. at1116.
110 Power, supra note 2, at 2750-2751.
111 LNC Inv., Inc. v. Republic of Nicar., No. 96 Civ. 6360, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1846, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19,1999).
112 Id. at *1-2.
113 See id. at *3-4 (listing some of the terms of the 1980 Loan Agreement).
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The principal amount of the Category I Debt was divided into
three installments, called Tranche"4 A, Tranche B, and Tranche C
loans. The 1980 Loan Agreement also listed dates by which Nica-
ragua was required to pay back certain amounts.115 When Nicara-
gua failed to meet the payment schedule in the 1980 Loan Agree-
ment, a letter, called the First Letter Agreement (dated February 9,
1984), was written to amend the original Agreement" 6 Since Nica-
ragua was also unable to meet the payment schedule in the First
Letter Agreement, it was further amended in the Second Letter
Agreement, which was signed shortly over a year later (on June 17,
1985).117 Nicaragua also was unable to make its payments under
the Second Letter Agreement.
On October 3, 1986, LNC purchased by assignment over $18
million in Category I Debt, including the accrued interest, from
Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. ("Drexel") for just over $896,000i"
In August 1987, LNC purchased another $7,783,028.19 of debt by
assignment from National Westminster Bank USA ("National
Westminster").nl9
The Bank of America was the servicing bank for Nicaragua's
Category I Debt. It listed LNC as the record owner of
$26,252,287.40 of Category I Debt. Nicaragua also had notice that
LNC was the record owner of this portion of debt.120 Under the
1980 Loan Agreement, Nicaragua issued promissory notes to all
record owners of Category I Debt.21 Although National Westmin-
ster gave promissory notes to LNC following the assignment of its
debt, Drexel failed to do the same despite its promisej2 2 In 1990,
Drexel filed for bankruptcy. In 1996, the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the Southern District of New York authorized Drexel's
successor to destroy all files held in storage. This included all but
one of the promissory notes that should have been delivered to
LNC under the assignment agreement m Therefore, the promis-
114 A tranche is an installment of a loan.
115 LNC Inv., Inc, 1999 US. Dist. LEXIS 1846, at *3.
116 Id. at*4-5.
117 Id. at *5.
118 See id. at *7 (describing LNC's purchase of debt from Drexel).
119 Id.
120 See id. at *8.
121 Id. at*1O.
12 See id. at*10-11.
V3 See id. at *11-12.
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sory notes that LNC received from Drexel only accounted for
$2,327,535.84 of the Category I Debt that Drexel assigned to LNC.124
Nicaragua offered to purchase its Category I Debt from the rec-
ord owners for eight percent of the amount of the outstanding
principal in September 1995.125 Record owners choosing to sell
their debt back to Nicaragua were not required to show their
promissory notes, but if they accepted the debt purchase offer, they
were required to destroy any promissory notes that they had for
Category I Debt.126 Eighty percent of the record owners of Cate-
gory I Debt accepted the debt purchase offer and sold their hold-
ings back to Nicaragua. 127 LNC decided not to participate in the
debt purchase offer and retained its Category I holdings of
$26,252,287.40.128 Instead, LNC demanded that Nicaragua pay
LNC the full amount of its portion of the debt. Nicaragua refused
and LNC filed suit seeking to recover that money.129
Nicaragua argued that section 10.11 of the 1980 Loan Agree-
ment only allowed assignment of debt to financial institutions and
banks, and that LNC did not qualify as either. It therefore con-
tended that the assignment of Category I Debt to LNC was im-
proper and, for that reason, unenforceable. 130 In rejecting Nicara-
gua's argument, the court relied on another Latin American
sovereign debt case, Pravin Banker Associates, Ltd. v. Banco Popular
del Peru.'3' In Pravin, the Second Circuit found that under New
York law, "[t]o reveal the intent necessary to preclude the power to
assign, or cause an assignment violative of contractual provisions
to be wholly void, [a contractual] clause must contain express pro-
visions that any assignment shall be void or invalid if not made in
a certain specified way."132 The language in LNC specifically al-
lowed assignment to banks and financial institutions, but it did not
124 Id. at *11.
125 Id. at *12.
126 Id. at *12-13 (describing Nicaragua's Debt Purchase Offer).
127 Id. at *13.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id. at *15-16.
131 Pravin Banker Assocs., Ltd. v. Banco Popular del Peru, 109 F.3d 850 (2d
Cir. 1997).
132 Id. at 856 (quoting University Mews Assocs. v. Jean-marie, 471 N.Y.S.2d
457,461 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1983)).
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expressly preclude assignment to any other parties. 3 3 The court
therefore determined that the assignments of Category I Debt to
LNC by Drexel and National Westminster were valid.134
In its second argument, Nicaragua contended that LNC would
only be able to recover the portion of the debt for which it pos-
sessed promissory notes.3 The court found, however, that section
2.13(e) of the 1980 Loan Agreement provided that if a promissory
note is lost or destroyed, the amount of debt held by a record
owner shall be deemed to be the amount listed by the servicing
bank.36 The promissory notes that LNC should have received
from Drexel were destroyed pursuant to the order of the Bank-
ruptcy Court. The court determined that the account maintained
by the Bank of America, the servicing bank, was sufficient to prove
the amount owed to LNC. 7
The court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff, LNC
Investments, in the amount of $26,252,287A.' 3
5.3. Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Banco de la Naci6n
Most recently, the Second Circuit decided Elliott Associates, L.P.
v. Banco de la Naci6n.139 This case was brought on appeal from the
Southern District of New York, from a judgment dismissing the
plaintiff's complaint because the court "found that Elliott had pur-
chased the debt in violation of section 489 of the New York Judici-
ary Law."140
Elliott Associates ("Elliott) is an investment fund that primar-
ily invests in the securities of debtors who have defaulted on their
133 LNC Inv., 1999 U.S. Dist LEXIS 1846, at *6-7 (quoting section 10.11 of the
1980 Loan Agreement).
134 Id. at'17-18.
13 See id. at *18 (revealing the basis of Nicaragua's argument as section
2.13(e) of the 1980 Loan Agreement).
136 Id. at*18.
137 Id. at *20-21 ("The records maintained by both the Bank of America and by
LNC indicate that LNC owned $26,252,287.40 of Nicaragua's Category I Debt, ex-
cluding interest accrued after June 1986.").
13 Id. at*21.
'39 Elliott Assocs. v. Banco de la Naci6n, 194 F.3d 363 (2d Cir. 1999).
140 Id. at 365; see also Elliott Assocs. v. Republic of Peru, 12 F. Supp. 2d 328
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that New York's champerty statute prohibited the pur-
chase of sovereign debt with the intent to sue under the circumstances of the
case).
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payment obligations.141 In October 1995, Elliott purchased ap-
proximately $28.75 million of Panamanian sovereign debt, and
brought suit against Panama in July 1996 for full payment of that
debt. As a result of that suit, Elliott received over $57 milion.142
During the first three months of 1996, Elliott acquired the debt
at issue in this suit. It purchased by assignment a total of $20.7
million in principal of Peruvian working capital debt143 from ING
Bank, N.V. ("ING") and Swiss Bank Corporation ("Swiss Bank").' 44
In May 1996, Elliott notified Banco de la Naci6n ("Naci6n") and the
Republic of Peru ("Peru") that it was interested in starting up ne-
gotiations about the repayment of Elliott's debt holdings, but ne-
gotiations never took place.145 Naci6n and Peru refused to engage
in any deals with Elliott because they regarded the debt assign-
ments as invalid since Elliott was not a financial institution.146
Near the end of June 1996, Elliott sent Naci6n and Peru a notice of
default. When the debtors refused to pay, Elliott filed suit in the
New York Supreme Court for an ex parte order of prejudgment
attachment. 47 The suit was removed to federal district court under
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.148 Elliott's motion for pre-
judgment attachment was denied, as well as its motion for sum-
mary judgment.149 After a bench trial, the district court found that
Elliott had "purchased the Peruvian debt with the intent and pur-
pose to sue" and "did not seriously consider alternatives to bring-
ing an action."' 50 For this reason, the district court ruled that
Elliott's contracts were unenforceable because they were entered
into with champertous intent in violation of New York law.'5 '
In its discussion, the Second Circuit focused on interpreting
141 Elliot Assocs., 194 F.3d at 365.
142 Id. at 366.
143 Working capital debt "consists of direct loans between single lenders and
borrowers, whereas syndicated bank debt is debt syndicated by a lead bank,
which maintains books and records for all holders." Id. at 367.
144 Id. at 366-67 (detailing the assignments from ING and Swiss Bank).
145 Id. at 367.
146 See id; see also Pravin Banker Assocs., 109 F.3d at 856 (noting the claim that
factual issues exist regarding Pravin's status as a financial institution).
147 Elliott Assocs., 194 F.3d at 368.
148 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1994).
149 Elliott Assocs., 194 F.3d at 368.
150 Elliott Assocs., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 332, 338.
151 See id. at 356 (elaborating on Elliott's violations of section 489 of the New
York Judiciary Law).
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section 489 of the New York Judiciary Law. It found that "the ac-
quisition of a debt with intent to bring suit against the debtor is not
a violation of the statute where, as here, the primary purpose of the
suit is the collection of the debt acquired."' 52 The court cited exten-
sively from a New York Court of Appeals case, Moses v. McDivitt,
in reaching its decision. 53 According to the Moses court, "trio con-
stitute the offense the primary purpose of the purchase must be to
enable him to bring a suit, and the intent to bring a suit must not be
merely incidental and contingent.' s4
Using Moses and subsequent cases, the Second Circuit found
that Elliott's intention to bring suit against Naci6n and the Repub-
lic of Peru was secondary to its intention to be paid in full for the
debt that it purchased. 55 Additionally, because Elliott had at-
tempted to negotiate terms of repayment with the debtors, Elliott's
intention to file suit was contingent upon the debtors' refusal to
negotiate or to repay the debt at Elliott's request.15S The court
therefore held that Elliott had not violated the New York Judiciary
Law and that the district court had, in fact, misinterpreted section
489157
Pursuant to these findings, the Second Circuit reversed and
remanded for further proceedings.'5s Subsequently, judgment was
ordered in favor of Elliott Associates. Naci6n was ordered to pay
$24,725,391.41 and Peru was ordered to pay $55,660,831.56, for
principal and past due interest. 59
6. ANALYSIS OF RECENT CASE LAw
Each of the three cases described above has had a major impact
on the way sovereign debt, and its creditors, are treated in the
United States. Although the United States submitted a statement
of interest on behalf of the defendants in CIBC Bank, it seems fairly
clear that the United States' interests generally lie with the credi-
152 Elliott Assocs., 194 F.3d at 372.
153 Moses v. McDivitt, 88 N.Y. 63 (1882).
154 Id. at 65.
1-5 Elliott Assocs., 194 F.3d at 379.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 381.
155 Id.
159 Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Banco de la Naci6n, 96 Civ. 7916, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14169, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29,2000).
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tors.
The Elliott Associates court spent quite a bit of time setting forth
its policy reasons for overturning the district court's decision.160
Although the United States is a strong proponent of the Brady
Plan, the goal of the United States is to entice creditors to partici-
pate voluntarily. Therefore, if creditors were barred from recov-
ering debts owed to them in court, they would effectively be forced
either to accept some form of debt restructuring or to lose all hope
of ever seeing a return on their investments.161 This would, the ar-
gument concludes, cause the progress made by the Brady Plan to
collapse. Because the plan was designed to be voluntary, it would
be completely undermined were creditors prevented from bringing
suit on the debt. For this reason, federal courts in the United States
permit suits by sovereign debt creditors, and allow for large, and
sometimes full, recoveries.
Another policy reason put forth by the Elliott court involves a
seemingly pro-Latin American perspective. The court reasoned
that in order for investors to continue lending money to Latin
American nations, as well as to other markets, there needs to be a
means of enforcing debt contracts. Otherwise, there will be no in-
vestment, which causes serious repercussions for further invest-
ment in Latin American countries. Without a means of enforcing
sovereign debt obligations, the next time a Latin American gov-
ernment is in need of money, it will find no willing investors. In
essence, this argument suggests that the use of litigation as an en-
forcement mechanism benefits those nations in need of financial
assistance.
However, while many understandably accept the validity of
these arguments, it appears that the United States is forgetting a
very important point-if the Latin American sovereigns had the
money to pay their debts, they would have done so. Additionally,
some creditors may refuse to participate in a Brady Plan or other
type of debt restructuring scheme because they believe that there is
a possibility of a greater recovery through litigation. Elliott Asso-
ciates "frequently engages in direct negotiations with the debtor
and argues that, as a result, it has occasionally received a greater
160 See generally Elliott Assocs., 194 F.3d at 379-81 (outlining the competing
policy interests at issue in sovereign debt cases).
161 See id. at 379-80 (citing Pravin Banker Assocs., Ltd. v. Banco Popular del
Peru, 109 F.3d 850 (2d Cir. 1997)).
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return than other creditors."162 Elliott's use of the court system is a
means of inducing its debtors to negotiate.
In both CIBC Bank and Elliott Associates, the courts found that
the plaintiffs did not violate the anti-champerty statute, section 489
of the New York Judiciary Law, because they purchased the debt
with the intent to recover the debt owed and not with the specific
intent to litigate. 63 This conclusion fits in conveniently with the
pro-creditor policy of the United States. Although the recovery of
debt is not considered a champertous motive and participation in a
restructuring program is voluntary, the creditor-plaintiffs must
have known that litigation would have been the only other way to
recover their portion of the debt when they purchased it. In some
cases, the primary motive for purchasing Latin American debt was
for the creditors to recoup their money through litigation. The
Brady Plan restructurings assisted in the stabilization of the Latin
American debt market and enabled the possibility of some recov-
ery by creditors at a future date. However, the creditors who
brought suit in federal courts were apparently too greedy to wait
In all three of the above cases, the plaintiffs received millions of
dollars in judgment or settlement. This was even the case in CIBC
Bank, in which the court decided that it was possible for a sover-
eign debtor to retain a majority interest in its own debt and thereby
block other creditors from causing an acceleration of payment.
This seemed to be a major step in favor of the Latin American
debtors because it allowed them to subvert, to some extent, the
ability of other creditors to recoup their debt payments at the ex-
pense of a nation that was not fiscally ready to pay them. How-
ever, the case settled and the plaintiff received millions of dollars
in spite of its inability to accelerate the debt payment on its own.
CIBC Bank, LNC Investments, and Elliott Associates are not the
only three cases decided in favor of creditors of sovereign debtors.
Instead, these three cases were chosen for analysis because they
each deal with a different debtor nation within Latin America. It
appears that the policy of the United States towards sovereign
debtors, irrespective of which nation they represent, is to allow
creditors to recover at their own expense, through the use of the
federal court system.
162 Elliott Assocs., 194 F.3d at 365.
163 CIBC Bank, 886 F. Supp. at 111; Elliott Assocs., 194 F.3d at 378-379.
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7. ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The result of litigation by sovereign debt creditors leaves
debtor nations in the position of paying judgments with money
that they do not have. Instead of allowing debtor nations time to
settle their fragile economies, these nations are left in worse posi-
tions than before. Therefore, solutions must be devised to permit
Latin American governments to achieve stability while satisfying
their creditors. While various commentators have proposed nu-
merous solutions to this problem,164 two are the most viable: the
use of exit consents and the placement of a limit on recovery in a
lawsuit.
7.1. Exit Consents
Many sovereign bond agreements contain clauses that permit a
specified percentage of the creditors to amend the terms of the
bond, except for the amount and due dates of the payments.165 Exit
consents create new bond agreements with terms more favorable
to the debtors and allow creditors to voluntarily exchange their old
agreements for the new ones. However, because many creditors
would be wont to relinquish their old bonds (hoping to get paid
earlier), it is necessary for those creditors switching to the new
agreement to amend the terms of the old agreement to make the
older terms less amenable to the remaining "holdout" creditors.166
The exit consents allow sovereign debtors to restructure their debt
agreements and to induce creditors who would otherwise not
agree to a restructuring by adding provisions that make the new,
restructured agreement more attractive. This new agreement is
also more favorable to borrower nations, as it "reflect[s] the bor-
rower's anticipated future debt-servicing capacity"167 without
forcing them to pay back exorbitant amounts of debt before first
acquiring the finances to do so.
In the absence of exit consents, it is normally more advanta-
164 See, e.g., BARRY EICHENGREEN, TOWARD A NEW INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
ARCHITECTURE 65-67 (1999) (favoring changes to international lending contracts to
allow debtors to renegotiate); Kenneth Rogoff, International Institutions for Reduc-
ing Global Financial Instability, J. ECON. PERsP., Fall 1999, at 21, 30 (discussing pro-
posals for an international bankruptcy court).
165 Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond Ex-
changes, 48 UCLA L. REv. 59,66 (2000).
166 See id.
167 Id.
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geous for creditors to hold on to their old agreements. A majority
of holdout creditors are able to force an acceleration of the pay-
ments' 6 and, almost inevitably, cause the debtor to default. This
enables creditors to sue in federal court in the United States and,
given current case law in this area, recover a substantial portion, if
not all, of the money owed. If the sovereign did not default, the
creditors still receive their money. Either of these eventualities are
be detrimental to the economic health of the Latin American gov-
ernment in question.
The use of exit consents to render the old bond agreements less
attractive therefore helps solve the problem of huge federal court
judgments in favor of holdout creditors. It also gives sovereign
debtors more time to stabilize their economies before having to pay
back debts with money that they do not have, which either forces
them to take out new loans, creating a vicious cycle, or leads to the
total collapse of their already fragile economic systems.
7.2. Limits on Recoven in Lavsuits
Samuel Goldman proposed placing a ceiling on the amount of
money that can be recovered by a creditor of a sovereign nation in
a lawsuiL169 This limit could either be calculated as a percentage of
the total debt of a nation, thus allowing each creditor a pro rata
share, or it could be a set number, permitting the creditor who gets
to court first to collect the entire amount.170 There are several be-
liefs behind the institution of a limited recovery system. Investors
might be more likely to purchase smaller pieces of debt, rather
than larger ones, knowing they would lose money in the event of
default because they would be unable to litigate for the full
amount.'i In addition, this provides an incentive for debtor na-
tions to be more responsible instead of partaking in riskier ven-
tures because there is a greater chance that the country will have to
pay out smaller amounts of debt rather than larger portions. Thus,
borrowers will not have to risk the possibility of a bigger payoff in
order to pay off creditors. 72 If investors find that they are able to
recover money through lawsuits, they might be more interested in
16S Id.
169 Goldman, supra note 8, 176-84.
170 See id. at 176-77.
171 Id. at 178.
'72 See id. at 179-80.
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purchasing debt, leading to a more liquid and efficient market17 3
7.3. Further Analysis of Proposed Solutions
Each of the above solutions would provide a cushion for Latin
American debtors by allowing them either more time or less of a
burden in paying off their debts. A combination of these two pro-
posals would be even more effective.
Exit consents are intended to persuade creditors to accept new
bond agreements with more relaxed payment provisions. Potential
holdout creditors, ideally, choose to exchange their old bond
agreements, now with less favorable terms for debtholders, for
new bond agreements that are more attractive to both creditors
and debtors. The more creditors that accept the new agreements,
the fewer holdouts there are to force accelerations of payment and
thereby cause default. This would in turn lead to less litigation
and, hopefully, more money to be used by Latin American debtors
in rebuilding their infrastructures.
Placing a limit on recovery in lawsuits also leads to the avail-
ability and recirculation of more money in borrower nations be-
cause payouts would be smaller. However, this does not necessar-
ily reduce the number of lawsuits being brought. Because each
creditor is interested in owning a smaller piece of debt, there are
more investors, each with a claim that could be brought in federal
court. This is especially true if the limitation placed enables each
creditor to receive his or her pro rata share of the total debt. While
individual recoveries would not be as large as they are now, there
would be tremendous litigation costs for the borrowers. There are
no incentives for creditors to refrain from bringing suit, especially
since they have the potential to get some money back.
Therefore, the best solution is to structure the exit consents to
amend the old bond agreements to limit the amount of money that
can be recovered in a lawsuit, or to limit the number of lawsuits
that can be brought by creditors. This induces more potential
holdouts to exchange their old debt for new debt and thereby re-
duces the number of lawsuits brought. If debtholders had the
choice of either litigating and recovering only a portion of their
money or switching to a new agreement and waiting only a few
more years for the possibility of a full return, many would be
swayed to accept the new terms. Thus, while it will take longer for
173 Id. at 180.
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the creditors to get back their investments, they will get back one-
hundred percent of that which they loaned to the sovereigns in-
stead of holding out for a chance at a small percentage of the loan
through litigation. As for the borrowers, they will have more time
to rebuild their economies before having to pay back the principal
on their debt, thereby creating a less-pressured situation for them.
There will be a smaller chance of litigation and, regarding suits
that are brought, borrowers will have to deal with much smaller
payouts.
It can be argued that the use of exit consents is manipulative
and that by including a provision limiting or precluding the ability
to bring suit, creditors are being unfairly deprived of a means of
recovering their investment. However, the creditors retain a
choice. Exchanging old bond agreements for new ones would be
done on a purely voluntary basis. Although the exchange option is
likely to be more advantageous after the old agreements are
amended, creditors would not be forced to accept the new terms.
Therefore, exit consents should be used to amend bond agree-
ments in order to restrict or limit recovery in lawsuits by sovereign
debt creditors. This solution would be advantageous to all in-
volved and will lead to greater stability in Latin America.
8. CONCLUSION
Throughout the past two decades, Latin American nations have
been struggling to keep up with debt obligation payments while
still trying to prevent the total collapse of their economies. While
several countries have been able to exchange some of their Brady
bonds for their own more stable, uncollateralized bonds, signifying
the return of economic health, others have not been so fortunate.
Argentina, which owes almost $130 billion in sovereign debt, is on
the verge of default. The government and its creditors need to
collaborate in order to prevent this disaster, which is otherwise in-
evitable.
This hope of collaboration is complicated, however, by the pos-
sibility that debtholders, instead of working to reach the goal of
economic health for Argentina, would choose to bring suit against
the impoverished nation. Recent litigation in other Latin American
nations has resulted in huge payments to creditors who have re-
fused to participate in the restructuring programs that are the bor-
rowers' best hopes of getting back onto their feet. These judgments
have led to, and will continue to lead to, the further weakening of
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the debtor states unless something is done. The use of exit consent
amendments limiting or precluding recovery through lawsuits
may be the solution that will both satisfy creditors and permit
Latin America to rebuild itself.
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